伊朗石油危机：从民族主义到政变

这本书以1951年4月至1953年8月之间动荡的28个月为重点，以最近解密的中央情报局和美国国务院摩萨德克政府的文件为基础，讲述了伊朗石油危机的故事，这场危机将在1953年8月的政变中达到高潮。埃尔文和阿布拉哈米安（Ervand Abrahamian）揭示了美国在1953年政变之前的伊朗内部政治、议会政治，甚至在1952年拯救君主制方面有多么沉迷。
通过权衡内部不满、对共产主义的恐惧和石油国有化等对政变的对立解释，阿布拉哈米安展示了杜鲁门和艾森豪威尔政府在对摩萨德克的政策上没有显著差异，以及早期政变令人惊讶的主要障碍是国王本人。通过追踪美国和中央情报局在伊朗的关键参与，这项研究显示了1953年的政变将如何最终为1979年的伊朗革命铺平道路，这是伊朗现代史上最重要、研究最广泛的两次事件。
Oil Crisis in Iran: From Nationalism to Coup d’Etat
Focusing on the turbulent twenty-eight months between April 1951 and August 1953, this book, based on recently declassified CIA and US State Department documents from the Mossadeq administration tell the story of the Iranian oil crisis, which would culminate in the coup of August 1953. Throwing fresh light on US involvement in Iran, Ervand Abrahamian reveals exactly how immersed the US was in internal Iranian politics long before the 1953 coup, in parliamentary politics and even in saving the monarchy in 1952.
By weighing rival explanations for the coup, from internal discontent, a fear of communism and oil nationalization, Abrahamian shows how the Truman and Eisenhower administrations did not differ significantly in their policies towards Mossadeq, and how the surprising main obstacle to an earlier coup was the shah himself. In tracing the key involvement of the US and CIA in Iran, this study shows how the 1953 coup would eventually pave the way to the 1979 Iranian revolution, two of the most significant and widely studied episodes of modern Iranian history.

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